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Abstracts: The United States Supreme Court holding in Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. clarified years of takings jurisprudence and overturned a 
controversial decision in the case of Agins v. City of Tiburon.  This article 
discusses how the Lingle court denounced the “substantially advances” test 
created in Agins, as a due process inquiry rather than a proper takings test.  The 
Lingle court instead opted to create a clear four-category paradigm for takings 
cases, which focuses on the burden the government places on private property 
rights in order to distinguish takings categories.   
 
*** 
 
In the Supreme Court’s landmark decision Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.1 
the Court untangled the web of regulatory taking jurisprudence.  Much of the 
murkiness in this area of law stems from the Court’s decision in Agins v. City of 
Tiburon.2  In Agins, the Court stated that a governmental regulation could be a 
taking if it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an 
owner economically viable use of his land.  This is a disjunctive test: if either 
prong is violated, the Court said, a taking occurs and compensation is the proper 
remedy.  
 
In a unanimous decision, the Court held in Lingle that the Agins 
“substantially advances” formula is not an appropriate test for determining 
whether a regulation constitutes a taking under the Fifth Amendment.  The 
“formula prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a takings, test, 
and . . . it has no proper place in . . . takings jurisprudence.”3  The effect of the 
Court’s holding and its explanatory dicta is to clarify greatly the field of regulatory 
takings law as applied to land use regulations and agency determinations.  
 
In Lingle, Chevron challenged a Hawaii statute that placed a cap on the 
amount of rent an oil company may charge a lessee-dealer.  Hawaii enacted Act 
257 in June of 1997 in order to protect gasoline prices from inflation due to the 
effects of market concentration.  Chevron filed suit in the United States District 
Court for the District of Hawaii claiming the Act effected a taking of its property 
and sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction against the application of 
the rent cap to its stations.  
 
The parties stipulated “that Chevron has earned in the past, and 
anticipates that it will continue to earn under Act 257, a return on its investment in 
lessee-dealer stations in Hawaii that satisfies any constitutional standard.”4  
Patently, Act 257 did not effect a taking because it deprived Chevron of an 
economically viable use of its property.  After weighing the testimony of the 
litigants’ dueling experts, the District Court held that the statute constituted an 
unconstitutional taking because it did not achieve its intended objective and, 
therefore, did not substantially advance a legitimate state interest.  The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.   
 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that property shall 
not be taken for public use without just compensation.  “In other words, it ‘is 
designed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, 
but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference 
amounting to a taking.”5  “The paradigmatic taking requiring just compensation is 
a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private property.”6  
“Beginning with [Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.] Mahon, however, the Court 
recognized that government regulation of private property may, in some 
instances, be so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or 
ouster -- and that such ‘regulatory takings’ may be compensable under the Fifth 
Amendment.”7  In determining whether a regulation is a taking, the Court states 
that “we must remain cognizant that ‘government regulation -- by definition -- 
involves the adjustment of rights for the public good,’ and that ‘Government 
hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be 
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.’”8   
 
Four Categories of Takings Cases 
 
The Court in Lingle identifies four categories of regulatory takings cases.  
The tests created by the Court in each category aim to “identify regulatory 
actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government 
directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain.  
Accordingly, each of these tests focuses directly upon the severity of the burden 
that government imposes upon private property rights.”9  The first two categories 
are per se takings: void on their face without regard to the extent of their impact 
on aggrieved property owners.  “First, where government requires an owner to 
suffer a permanent physical invasion of her property – however minor – it must 
provide just compensation.”10  “A second categorical rule applies to regulations 
that completely deprive an owner of ‘all economically beneficial use’ of her 
property.”11  The third category, land use exactions, involves the imposition by a 
land use approval board of a condition requiring a landowner dedicate an 
easement allowing public access to her property – the effect of which is to oust 
the landowner from a portion of her domain.12  Within this category the Court’s 
test is whether the condition advances the same public interest that would allow 
the board to deny the application. It conducts a fact-based, or as applied, inquiry 
to determine whether there is an essential nexus between the condition imposed 
and the impact of the proposed development on the community.  
 
“Outside these two ‘relatively narrow categories’ (and the special context 
of land-use exactions . . . ) regulatory takings challenges are governed by the 
standards set forth in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City.”13  The Penn 
Central “principal guidelines” are: the economic impact of the regulation on the 
claimant, particularly the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations, and the character of the governmental 
regulation.  “[T]he Penn Central inquiry turns in large part, albeit not exclusively, 
upon the magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact and the degree to which it 
interferes with legitimate property interests.”14  
 
In Lingle, the lower courts held that Act 257 is a taking because it fails to 
meet the Agins “substantially advances” test.  These courts held that the Act did 
not substantially advance the legitimate state interest of controlling gasoline 
prices. In arriving at its conclusion, the District Court weighed the 
reasonableness of two opposing economists who testified on behalf of the 
litigants; it found one expert’s views more persuasive than those of the other and 
concluded that Act 257 would not achieve the objective of controlling gasoline 
prices.  In the Supreme Court’s own words, using the Agins test in this way 
“would require courts to scrutinize the efficacy of a vast array of state and federal 
regulations -- a task for which courts are not well suited.  Moreover, it would 
empower -- and often require -- the courts to substitute their predictive judgments 
for those of elected legislatures and expert agencies.”15 
 
 According to the Court, the Agins test is “regrettably imprecise” and “such 
a test is not a valid method of discerning whether private property has been 
‘taken’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.”16  “There is no question that the 
‘substantially advances’ formula was derived from due process, not takings, 
precedents.”17  “[T]he ‘substantially advances’ inquiry reveals nothing about the 
magnitude or character of the burden a particular regulation imposes upon 
private property rights.  Nor does it provide any information about how any 
regulatory burden is distributed among property owners.”18  “The notion that . . . 
a regulation . . . ‘takes’ private property for public use merely by virtue of its 
ineffectiveness or foolishness is untenable.”19  The “takings Clause presupposes 
that the government has acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose.”20  
 
 In reaching its conclusion to remove the Agins test from takings 
jurisprudence, the Court held that it was not necessary to disturb any prior 
holding because a taking has never been found based on the Agins inquiry.  
Rather, the Court “correct[ed] course” by holding that the “substantially 
advances” formula is not a valid taking test.    
 
Applicable Tests 
 
 Per se cases: The Lingle roadmap to regulatory takings provides 
practitioners and scholars with clear directions.  There are two types of per se 
takings, where no factual investigation of the extent of the regulatory burden is 
required.  The first of these is where a regulation invades the owner’s exclusive 
right of possession. The seminal Supreme Court case in this category, where 
attorneys may turn for specific guidance, is Loretto v. Telemprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp.21  The second per se category involves regulations that deny 
property owners all economically beneficial use of their property.  The applicable 
test here is contained in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.22   
 
As applied cases: The two other categories of regulatory takings involve 
“as applied” investigations where the court examines the extent of the burden 
imposed and the character of the regulation involved.  Where land use agencies, 
in their adjudicative role, impose conditions that require owners to allow the 
public on their land, courts must determine whether there is an essential nexus 
and rough proportionality between the condition imposed and the impact of the 
proposed development on the public.  Cases clarifying the rules within this 
category are Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n23 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.24  
The Lingle Court explains that Nollan and Dolan “involve a special application of 
the ‘doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,' which provides that ‘the government 
may not require a person to give up a constitutional right -- here the right to 
receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use -- in exchange 
for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit has 
little or no relationship to the property.’”25  “In short, Nollan and Dolan cannot be 
characterized as applying the ‘substantially advances’ test we address today, 
and our decision should not be read to disturb these precedents.”26  The second 
category in the “as applied” realm involves a balancing of factors, under the Penn 
Central test - notably the character of the challenged regulation and extent to 
which the regulation interferes with the owner’s distinct investment-backed 
expectations.  
 
“Deprivation” Cases – The Due Process Clause 
 
In Lingle, the Court further clarified that the Due Process Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution gives rise to an entirely separate body of case law, involving 
distinct tests, that can be used to challenge land use regulations. This clause 
states that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. In 
dicta, the Lingle Court reminds us that “a regulation that fails to serve any 
legitimate governmental objective may be so arbitrary or irrational that it runs 
afoul of the Due Process Clause.”27  Since 1894, under Lawton v. Steele28 the 
Court has applied a “deferential ‘reasonableness’ standard to determine whether 
a challenged regulation was a ‘valid exercise of the . . . police power’ under the 
Due Process Clause.”29 
 
In the more recent County of Sacramento v. Lewis30 case, the Court noted 
that the Due Process Clause protects property owners against “the exercise of 
power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate 
governmental objective.”31 Justice Kennedy writes a concurring opinion in Lingle 
to emphasize that the Court’s opinion “does not foreclose the possibility that a 
regulation might be so arbitrary or irrational as to violate due process.”32  In 
Lingle, the due process claim had been voluntarily dismissed by Chevron, so the 
Court did not address whether such a case existed. 
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